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Abstract - We study an evolutionary game in which the individual behavior of the economic agents 
can lead the economy either into a low-level or a high-level equilibrium. The model represents two 
asymmetric populations, “leaders and followers”, where in each round an economic agent of 
population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. Our evolutionary game is a signaling game in 
which only the leader has private information. The leader moves first; the follower observes the 
leader's action, but not the leader's type, before choosing her own action. We found the equilibria 
both as self-confirming and evolutionarily stable strategies. Furthermore, considering an imitative 
behavior of the followers, we show that to overcome the poverty trap there exists a threshold value 
equals to the ratio "education costs-efficiency wages" of the number of high-profile economic 
agents. 
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A poverty trap or low-level equilibrium is de￿ned as a self-perpetuating con-
dition where the economy caught in a vicious cycle and the economic agents
su⁄er from persistent underdevelopment (see Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005
and Bowles et al., 2006).
In this paper, we model an evolutionary coordination signaling game where
economic agents represent institutions such that their rational behavior may
raise poverty traps.1 We argued that poverty traps exist and account due to
strategic complementarities between pro￿les of economic agents (for example:
low-skilled workers, no innovative ￿rms, scarcity of human capital and R&D)
and that institutions and norms are key causes of their formation and persis-
tence. Institutions and norms are complex cognitive devices, which simultane-
ously result from the types of economic agents and include a series of intrinsic
properties2. Hence, it is the combination of multiple elements that may create
thresholds e⁄ects and entrap groups into low equilibria ￿ economic elements
(such as an environment of widespread poverty, commodity dependence), polit-
ical (predatory regimes) and local social norms.
The aim of this paper is to give a feasible answer to: how do we explain
that some countries have actually escaped from long stretches of poverty? Was
it just good luck or imitation of successful strategies followed elsewhere? We
argue that it is the imitative behavior of successful strategies one of the reasons
to escape from low-level equilibria. Because if we imitate by dissatisfaction it is
almost sure that we get a low-level equilibrium.
In this vein, the notion of poverty trap has been enriched by Steven Durlauf
with a spatial dimension on the idea that an individual￿ s socioeconomic out-
comes depend upon the composition of the various groups of which she is a
member over the course of her life. That is, the decision for an individual to
acquire an education strongly depends on the prior existence of other educated
members in a group. This interdependence of behavior induces "neighborhood
e⁄ects", which generate di⁄erent types of groups that have di⁄erent steady
states (with/without educated members). This interdependence may be in-
tertemporal, i.e. it a⁄ects future social interactions. The dynamics of these
combinations explain persistent income inequality: in Durlauf￿ s (1996) model
they create incentives for wealthier families to segregate themselves into eco-
nomically homogeneous neighborhoods. Economic strati￿cation combines with
1Game-theoretic models show that solutions and equilibria are multiple, with institutional
change being the selection of one equilibrium from many possible ones and which may be
sub-optimal. For Aoki (2001), the question of enforcement leads to analyzing the design of
institutions that can implement given social goals in a manner that is compatible with the
incentives of the players - according to a self-enforceable or an enforcement mechanism (Aoki
2001, p. 6). In this vein, Samuel Bowles has built the seminal concept of ￿ institutional
poverty traps￿ , which emphasizes that coordination failures and poverty traps are induced by
the presence of speci￿c institutions. Bowles de￿nes these as institutions that generate ￿highly
unequal divisions of the social product￿(Bowles 2006).
2Azariadis and Drazen (1990) examined the implications of threshold e⁄ects on the supply
side, while Acemoglu (1996) and Redding (1996) introduced poverty traps due to coordination
problem between ￿rms and workers.
1neighborhood e⁄ects: their reciprocal feedback transmit di⁄erent types of eco-
nomic status across generations. These processes also explain the persistence of
poverty in particular areas (such as American inner cities) (Durlauf 2003). It is
this concept of neighborhood that for Durlauf allows for the understanding of
why poverty traps exist and persist. Hence, poverty traps are de￿ned as a com-
munity that if it is composed initially by poor members or low-pro￿le economic
agents, then, it will remain in the low-level equilibrium over generations.
Hence, the types of economic agents and their neighborhood e⁄ects can ex-
plain whether an economy is situated in a low-level or high-level equilibrium.
For instance, Nelson and Phelps (1966) o⁄er a ￿rst attempt to modeling the
idea that the major role of education is to increase the individual￿ s capacity to
innovate, ￿rst, and to adapt to new technologies, second, thereby speeding up
technological di⁄usion through the economy (Aghion and Howit, 1999). There-
fore, high-pro￿le economic agents lead the economy in a high-level equilibrium.
In this vein, Azariadis (1996) shows that the initial level of technology is critical
for economic growth, that is, if a country to begin with satis￿es this threshold
level of technology, it will grow. However, if the country￿ s technology level is
too low, there will be no R&D and the economy will remain in a poverty trap of
zero growth. In this vein, in a seminal paper Lucas (1988) demonstrated that
human capital is the "engine" of economic growth.
In this paper, we present a coordination game between "leaders" and "follow-
ers" with di⁄erent pro￿les, that is, an evolutionary game of the complementarity
between the types of pro￿les of the economic agents. We show that the econ-
omy can be located in a low-level equilibrium and that there exists a threshold
level to overcome it. We found the self-con￿rming equilibria and the evolution-
arily stable strategies. We conclude that the possibility of either high-level or
low-level equilibria implies that players, economic agents, acting under identical
settings may experience either adequate living standard or deprivation (growth
or crisis), respectively, and it depends only on their histories or initial conditions.
Furthermore, we consider economic agents that stick to some pure strategy
for some time interval, and now and then reviews her strategy, sometimes re-
sulting in a change of strategy (early contributions start with Bj￿rnerstedt and
Weibull, 1995). There are two basic elements common to these models. The
￿rst is a speci￿cation of the time rate at which agents in the population review
their strategy choice. This rate may depend on the current performance of the
agent￿ s pure strategy and of other aspects of the current population state. The
second element is a speci￿cation of the choice probabilities of a reviewing agent.
The probability i-strategist will switch to some pure strategy j may depend
on the current performance of these strategies and other aspects of the current
population state. Hence, imitation can be driven by both dissatisfaction and
successful. In seeking an intentional explanation of imitative behavior, we must
search for possible (good) reasons for individuals to imitate others, and only if
this endeavor fails should we resort to explanations which assume that actors
act instinctually, randomly, or what not. In this sense, a rational imitation can
be explained as follows. An actor, A, can be said imitate the behavior of another
actor, B, when observation of the behavior of B a⁄ects A in such a way that A￿ s
2subsequent behavior becomes more similar to the observed behavior of B. An
actor can be said to act rationally when the actor, faced with a choice between
di⁄erent courses of action, chooses the course of action that is best with respect
to the actor￿ s interests and her beliefs about possible action opportunities and
their e⁄ects.
In this vein, theoretical advances to understand imitation have been explored
by Vega-Redondo (1997) and Schlag (1998, 1999). Both approaches are based
on the idea that individual who face repeated choice problems will imitate oth-
ers who obtained high payo⁄s. But despite this basic similarity, the two theories
imply markedly di⁄erent predictions when applied to speci￿c games. For exam-
ple, for games with a Cournot structure, Schlag￿ s model predicts the Walrasian
outcome and Vega-Redondo studies the evolution of Walrasian behavior. Basi-
cally, the models di⁄er along two di⁄erent dimensions, the informational struc-
ture ("whom agents imitate") and the behavioral rule ("how agents imitate").
While agents in Vega-Redondo￿ s model observe their immediate competitors,
in Schlag model they observe others who are just like them but play in di⁄er-
ent groups against di⁄erent opponents. Additionally, agents in Vega-Redondo￿ s
model copy the most successful action of the previous period whenever they
can. In contrast, Schlag￿ s agents only imitate in a probabilistic fashion and the
probability with which they imitate is proportional to the observed di⁄erence
in payo⁄s between own and most successful action. It can be show that the
di⁄erence between the two models is mainly due to the di⁄erent informational
assumptions rather that the di⁄erent adjustment rules. So, it is more important
whom one imitates that how imitates (see, J. Apesteguia et al., 2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
basic game while section 3 starts with the evolutionary game by picking up the
replicator dynamic equations and the ￿rst two important results on low-level
and high-level equilibria. Replicator by imitation is also considered. Section 4
analyzes the imitative behavior and the existence of a threshold level to overcome
the poverty trap. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Game
Consider an economy composed by agents with di⁄erent pro￿les, that is, the
economic agents split in two types: the high- and the low-pro￿les. We label the
vectors (H;L);(h;l) as the strategy space, si, denoting high- and low-pro￿les,
respectively, of sub-population i = 1;2. Consider a signaling game where the
economic agent of sub-population 2 is a "follower" and the one of sub-population
1 is a "leader" and choosing between high- and low-pro￿les does not have any
cost for the leader3.
The one-shot game starts with a representative agent of sub-population 1
3Signaling games are of incomplete information leader-follower games in which only the
leader has private information. The leader moves ￿rst; the follower observes the leader￿ s
action, but not the leader￿ s type, before choosing her own action (for more details Fundenberg
and Tirole, 1991).
3who may marriage with a representative agent of sub-population 2. To get
pro￿table outcomes, ￿i ((H;L);(h;l)), in this economy the player 1 must employ
2 under strategic complementarity, in the sense that, a H-type agent matching
with a h-type is more pro￿table than matching with a l-type, analogously, a
L-type agent matching with a l-type is more pro￿table than matching with a
h-type. The follower does not know the type of the leader, but she assumes
with probability ￿ to be hired by a H￿type and (1 ￿ ￿) by a L-type leader
strategist. The follower decidesto beocme a h￿type facing a training cost or
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Figure 1. Decisions￿tree.
where both agents 1 and 2 face an income tax represented by ￿ and ￿, respec-
tively. Gross-utility of 1 being H￿type is U or u and being L￿type is V or
v which depends on matching high- or low-pro￿le followers, respectively. The
h-type follower gets an income W when is hired by H and w when is hired by
L. By complementarity U > u ; V > v and W > w.
The H￿type leader is looking for h￿type followers sending a signal, e, of
extra-pro￿ts or e¢ ciency wages4, bounded on,
0 < e < (1 ￿ ￿)(U ￿ u)
We are interested in ￿nding the self-con￿rming equilibria (SCE), since it
is based on the idea that player should have correct beliefs about probability
4The concept posits a relationship between wages and productivity that over some range
is positive. Thus up to some point, raising wages may lower per-unit wage costs (Bellante,
1994).
4distributions that they observe su¢ ciently often. The original de￿nition of SCE
assumes that players observe the terminal node that is reached, but in some
settings it is natural to assume that they observe less than this. There are sev-
eral versions of SCE. The most straightforward to de￿ne is that of unitary SCE.
This requires that each player have beliefs ￿ over opponents play (ordinarily
the space of their behavior strategies) that satis￿es two basic criteria. First,
players should optimize relative to their beliefs. Second, beliefs should be cor-
rect at those information sets on the game tree that are reached with positive
probability. Put di⁄erently, the beliefs must assign probability one to the set
of opponent behavior strategies that are consistent with actual play at those
information sets.5 Nash equilibrium requires that players have correct beliefs
about the strategies their opponents use to map their types to their actions,
and in order for repeated observations to lead players to learn the distribution
of opponents￿strategies, the signals observed at the end of each round of play
must be su¢ ciently informative. Such information will tend to lead players to
also have correct and hence identical beliefs about the distribution of Nature￿ s
moves. Hence, SCE assumes that the players￿inferences are consistent with
their observations which are consistent with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE).6
De￿nition 1 (Fundenberg & Levine, 2007). ￿ is a unitary self-con￿rming
equilibrium if for each player i = 1;2 there are beliefs on their payo⁄ functions,
￿i; and for each strategy si = fH;L;h;lg with ￿i(si) > 0 such that
￿ si is a best response to ￿i and
￿ ￿i is correct at every node reached with positive probability under ￿.
To ￿nd the SCE let us adopt the principle of backward induction. Firstly, if
2 chooses the strategy of being h￿type, then, her expected payo⁄, Eh, is given
by:
Eh = ￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)W + e) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)w ￿ C: (1)
Alternatively, when 2 is choosing l-type,
El = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿W + (1 ￿ ￿)w): (2)
Thus, 2 prefers to be a h￿type strategist if E(h) > E(l), and it happens if





5This version of SCE allows outcomes that are not Nash equilibria, as shown by Fudenberg
& Kreps (1988), but it is outcome-equivalent to Nash equilibrium in 2 player games (Battigalli,
1987; Fudenberg & Kreps, 1995).
6Recall that a PBE involves optimal actions given beliefs and consistent beliefs in equilib-
rium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). In cases where more than one PBE is possible, it is also
appropriate to examine whether some can be ruled out. In some cases, PBEs rely on unrea-
sonable beliefs that are technically sustainable (because they are o⁄ the equilibrium path of
behavior) but unlikely to persist if people slightly deviate from equilibrium predictions.
5where C
e 2 (0;1) is the ratio "education costs-e¢ ciency wages", then, to de-
crease such value, it should be reduced the costs of education, C, or to increment
the signal of e¢ ciency wages, e.
This game has three SCE Nash Equilibria, the ￿rst one in mixed strategies









Recall that the term evolutionary process means only that more successful
types tend to proliferate while less successful types tend to disappear, an as-
sumption that applies equally well to learning and cultural evolution as well as
literal population replacement via natural selection. The model applies as long
as people tend to gravitate toward a type that does better than its alternatives.
3 Replicator dynamics
The simplest setting in which to study learning is one in which agents￿strate-
gies are completely observed at the end of each round, and agents are randomly
matched with a series of anonymous opponents, so that the agents have no
impact on what they observe. Hereafter, sub-populations of leaders (1) and
followers (2) are denoted by X1 and X2, respectively, and they are composed
by a large number of individuals which are facing the clue of selecting an ade-
quate level of pro￿les fH;Lg ; fh;lg, respectively. Let us denote a fraction of







for all pair i 2 f(H;L)(h;l)g of sub-population k 2 f1;2g, respectively. That is,










2 = X2 is assumed
to be a constant. Assume that both sub-populations are of the same ￿nite size
and normalized to 1, xH
1 + xL
1 = 1 and xh
2 + xl
2 = 1. Note that the probability
￿ = xH
1 :
Now, the economic agents of each sub-population have expected payo⁄s,
Eh
2 = xH
1 ((1 ￿ ￿)W + e) + (1 ￿ xH
1 )(1 ￿ ￿)w ￿ C (6)
El
2 = xH
1 (1 ￿ ￿)W + (1 ￿ xH
1 )(1 ￿ ￿)w (7)
EH
1 = xh
2 ((1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ W ￿ e) + (1 ￿ xh
2)((1 ￿ ￿)u ￿ W) (8)
EL
1 = xh
2 ((1 ￿ ￿)v ￿ w) + (1 ￿ xh
2)((1 ￿ ￿)V ￿ w) (9)
6We consider the n-population replicator dynamics (Weibull,1995:172) sug-
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the associated subpopulation share equals its excess payo⁄, Ei
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]:
Hence, we get the following system of replicator dynamics,
7A replicator dynamic equation is a process of change over time in the frequency distribu-
tion of the replicators (and in the nature of the environment and the structure of interaction),
in which strategies with higher payo⁄s reproduce faster in some appropriate sense. For in-
stance, it may generate novelty if random errors (￿mutations￿ or ￿perturbations￿) occur in
the replication process, allowing new replicators to emerge and di⁄use into the population if
they are relatively well adapted to the replicator system.
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is bounded in
the unit square C = [0;1] ￿ [0;1].
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￿(1 ￿ ￿)(V + u) ￿ (W ￿ w)
￿
In the above nonlinear system, in the steady state _ xh
2 = 0, _ xH
1 = 0, we obtain
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:
while of course the other four equilibria are the corners of the square itself.
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Figure 2. Solution orbits to the replicator dynamic system (10).
83.1 Dynamic stability and equilibria analysis
A strategy is an ESS if a whole population using that strategy cannot be invaded
by a small group with a mutant genotype. Similarly, a cultural form is an ESS
if, upon being adopted by all members of a society (￿rm, family, etc.), no small
group of individuals using an alternative cultural form can invade. We thus move
from explaining the actions of individuals to modeling the di⁄usion of forms of
behavior (￿strategies￿ ) in society (Gintis, 2000). Recall that, an equilibrium
in the replicator dynamics is an evolutionary equilibrium (and is equal to the
locally asymptotically stable point in dynamic systems), it is an evolutionarily
stable strategy and thus they are ESS of the game (Ross Cressman, 1992 and
Shone, 2003). Hence, we can assess whether the ￿ve equilibria are ESSs via
analyzing Jacobean Matrix of system (10), such that, equilibria ￿tting det(J) >
0 and tr(J) < 0 are asymptotically stable, thus they are ESS of the game. The
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a saddle and all other four being local attractors ((0,0) and (1,1)) or repulsors
((0,1) and (1,0)).
That is, (0,0) is the strategy pro￿le in which the economy will converge to
(low-pro￿le leaders, low-pro￿le followers) on the contrary (1,1) is the strategy
pro￿le that converges to (high-pro￿le leaders, high-pro￿le followers). Notice
that history dependence is obtained if and only if, depending on the initial
conditions, the optimal solutions of (7) converge towards two or more distinct
attractors, like (0,0) and (1,1). These are steady-states.
The thresholds separating di⁄erent longrun behaviors have been called oc-
casionally Skiba sets in the economic literature (see Brock and Malliaris, 1989).
Since the initial values of the adjoint variables di⁄er generically for di⁄erent
trajectories, the control exhibits a jump in a Skiba point. Hence, we found a








separating paths leading to stable high and low
level steady-states. Thus, this model can explain the coexistent of countries
with low and of countries with high growth as a function of their respective
initial conditions alone.
De￿nition 2 (Skiba, 1978). The Skiba curve is a set of critical values that
converges to ￿ P into the state of the C-square with the following property: the
optimal strategy is di⁄erent depending on which side of the threshold the current
state lies.
Consequently, the point ￿ P is a threshold where the dynamics leading to
9two di⁄erent long term solutions separate.10 Next propositions summarize the
results.
Proposition 1 The economy can be located either in a low-level equilibrium
(0;0) or high-level equilibrium (1;1) which are evolutionarily stable strategies.








are "SCE" to the









is a threshold level separating the basin of attractions from
the poverty trap to the high-level equilibrium through the Skiba curve.
Equilibrium (0,0), which is the low level equilibrium, is the most probable
outcome in less developed countries in early stages of development. It may
often be interpreted as a poverty trap, as it is characterized by low levels of
skills and technological pro￿le. On the other hand, the high level equilibrium
(1,1) is generally found in developed countries in which the existence of low-
pro￿le economic agents may be negligible. However, the mixed equilibrium can
be found also in some countries of Latin America (see Ros, 2001).
3.2 Replicator by imitation
Now, economic agents review their strategies and they can observe the perfor-
mance of their neighbors, so they wonder whether stick to a strategy/club or
change over, a function of the type of individuals in their own population they
encounter. This is a model of pure imitation driven by dissatisfaction where
all reviewing agents adopt the strategy of the ￿rst person that they meet in the
street, picking at random this person from the population (see Alos-Ferrer and
Weidenholzer, 2006; Bjornerstedt and Weibull, 1995 and Schlag, 1998; 1999).
Each period an i-type economic agent, i 2 fh;l;H;Lg, from sub-population
k 2 f1;2g, reviews her strategy with probability ri
k(x) wondering whether she
may or not change her current strategy, where x = (xi
1;xi
2); 8i 2 fh;l;H;Lg.
Let p
ij
k (x) be the probability that a reviewing i-strategist really changes to
some pure strategy j 6= i, 8j 2 fh;l;H;Lg. In the sequel, si = f(h;l);(H;L)g
will indicate vectors of pure strategies independently from population k.











k (x); as de￿ned in the above section xi
k is the fraction of
i￿type strategists. By the law of large numbers we model these processes as




















; 8 j 6= i 2 fh;l;H;Lg; k 2 f1;2g:
(13)
System (13) represents the interaction between two groups of economic
agents: leaders and followers changing their behaviors under imitations￿pressure
10Recall that, following the pioneering article of Skiba (1978), such thresholds have been
called Skiba points in the economic literature.
10driven by dissatisfaction The aim of this model is to capture an evolutionary
stable situation in which all members of the two di⁄erent sub-populations adopt
a behavior that is the better possible given the behavior of the individuals of
his own sub-population and the characteristic of the agents of the other sub-
population.
Let us assume that the decision of an economic agent depends upon the
utility associate with her own behavior, given composition of the other popu-
lation, labeled by the notation Ei
k(si;x￿k); 8i 2 fh;l;H;Lg; of sub-population
k;￿k 2 f1;2g;k 6= ￿k. Let ri
k(x) be the average time-rate at which an individ-














2 [0;1] is reasonably interpreted as the propen-
sity of a member from the i-th club that considers to switch membership as a
function of the expected utility gains from such a choice. Agents with less suc-
cessful strategies on average review their strategy at a higher rate than agents
with more successful strategies.
Once opted for a change, she will adopt the strategy followed by the ￿rst
population fellow to be encountered (her neighbor), i. e., for any k 2 f1;2g,




k; i;j 2 fh;l;H;Lg; i 6= j:

























































2 are the state variables) . However, by the normalization rule,
xH
1 + xL
1 = 1 and xh
2 + xl
2 = 1, equation (15) can be reduced to two equations
with two independent state variables. Taking the advantage of this property,
from now onwards we choose variables xh
k and xl
k with their respective equations.
For a ￿rst grasp of the problem, let us assume f
j
k to be linear in the utility
levels (Weibull, 1995). Thus, this rate is linearly decreasing in payo⁄s, that is,







= ￿k ￿ ￿kEi
k(sj;x￿k) 8 i 2 fH;L;h;lg:
with ￿k;￿k ￿ 0 and ￿k
￿k ￿ Ei
k(sj;x￿k). To get a full linear form, we assume
that,
Ei
k(sj;x￿k) = siAkx￿k; 8 i 2 fH;L;h;lg;
in other words, utility is a linear function of both variables, through a population-
speci￿c matrix of weights or constant coe¢ cients, Ak 2 M2￿2, (k 2 f1;2g).
11This latter assumption implies that utility levels re￿ ect population speci￿c (and
therefore in principle di⁄erent ) properties, i.e., broadly speaking preference










; 8 i 2 fH;L;h;lg; ￿ 2 f1;2g: (16)
Now we can study the evolution of the high-pro￿le economic agents by means
of their replicator dynamic, that is,
_ xH
1 = ￿1xH









where coe¢ cients a and b depend of course upon the entries of the two population-
speci￿c matrices, Ak.
3.2.1 Dynamic stability and Nash properties
System (17) admits ￿ve stationary states or dynamic equilibria, i.e.
(0;0); (0;1); (1;0); (1;1) and a positive interior equilibrium
￿
￿ xH













In fact, the interesting case is when ￿ P =
￿
￿ xH
1 ; ￿ xh
2
￿
is an equilibrium lying in








where vectors (a1;a2) and (b1;b2) have opposite signs. Next proposition gives a
main result.
Proposition 3 The consistent coe¢ cients range
￿
￿1
2 < (b1;b2) < 0 < (a1;a2)
￿
;
which depends on the composition of populations, ensures that the steady states
(1;1) and (0;0) are asymptotically stable equilibria and then ESS, while (1;0)
and (0;1) are non-stable nodes and
￿
￿ xH
1 ; ￿ xh
2
￿
is a saddle point.
Figure 3 gives a graphic representation to the solution orbits of the standard
two-population replicator dynamics (17) driven by imitation in the coordination
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Basin of attraction to
the poverty trap.
Figure 3. Solution orbits to the system (17) in the Leaders and Followers Coordination
Game by imitative behavior.
These equilibria can be interpreted as follows:
￿ A trivial equilibrium is one where none of the leaders is inclined to be
H￿type and to marry with h￿type followers and all of them are low-
pro￿le economic agents.
￿ On the other hand there is another equilibrium at the opposite corner
(where the sharing clubs involve all of their respective population): this
is the case where reciprocal integration, H￿type married with h￿type, of
the two sub-populations is complete. The two remaining border equilibria
show a di⁄erent club dominating the two sub-populations and in a sense
a mismatch between strategies.
￿ Finally, of course we have the interior equilibrium, this the case of complete
segregation. Here the economy is composed by marriages among low- or
high-pro￿le economic agents.
134 The imitative behavior of the followers
In this section, we are interested in the behavior of the followers, since they face
a training cost to be high-pro￿le economic agents when marriage with H￿type
leaders or they prefer a low-pro￿le when marriage with L￿type leaders.
Consider that such economic agents review their strategies following a ￿be-
havioral rule with inertia￿ (Schlag, 1999) that allows to reconsider an action
with a probability R 2 (0;1), that is, an i￿type strategist, i 2 fh;lg with prob-
ability Ri will ask herself whether to change or not her behavior11. Likewise,
let Pij be the probability that such an i￿type reviewing strategist will change
to strategy j 2 fh;lg; j 6= i. If strategy choices are statistically independent
random variables, the aggregate arrival rate of the Poisson process of individuals
who switch from one pure strategy i to another j is RiPij.
Hence, the ￿ ow of high-pro￿les individuals by _ xh
2, is equal to the number
of changing low-pro￿les minus the number of high-pro￿les individuals chang-
ing to the low-pro￿le￿ s club.12 Rearranging terms, one obtains the system of











2 are the fraction of high- and low-pro￿les economic agents of
the follower￿ s sub-population 2. We call an imitative behavior when an economic
agent decides to pass from the i￿ to the j￿strategy if i is currently more popular
than j, j ￿ i, in the sense that more individuals of population k currently use
i, then the choice probability of i should exceeds that of j.
De￿nition (Imitative behavior). A pro￿le￿ s population dynamics (18)
represents an imitative behavior if j ￿ i ) Pij > Pji, 8i;j 2 fh;lg;i 6= j.
Although an individual does not know all the true values of the payo⁄of the
other ones, it is possible that she can take a sample of true values in order to
estimate an average. Let ^ Ei and ^ Ej be the estimators for such true values Ei
and Ej. In the particular case that ^ El < ^ Eh or equation (18) holds, then, each
l￿type strategist prefers to be a h￿type if and only if the probability that an
l￿strategist becomes h￿strategist is given by P[ ^ Eh ￿ ^ El > 0]. Hence, (18) can
be written as,
_ xh
2 = RlP[ ^ Eh ￿ ^ El > 0]xl
2 ￿ RhP[ ^ El ￿ ^ Eh > 0]xh
2;
_ xl
2 = ￿_ xh
2.
(18)
11Then, Ri denotes the average time-rate at which an individual that currently uses strategy
i 2 fh;lg, reviews her strategy choice.
12Since we consider large populations, we invoke the law of large numbers and model these
aggregate stochastic processes as deterministic ￿ows, each such ￿ow being set equal to the
expected rate of the corresponding Poisson arrival process.
14Hence, an evaluation rule that seems particularly natural in a context of
simple imitation is the ￿average rule￿where each strategy is evaluated according
to the average payo⁄ observed in the reference group (see J. Apesteguia et al.,
2007). There are idiosyncratic preference di⁄erences between economic agents
in subpopulations and by the average rule we can get the next result.
Proposition 4 Consider that P[ ^ Ej ￿ ^ Ei > 0] increases proportionally to the
true value Ej, that is,




￿Ej if Ej > 0
0 if Ej ￿ 0
8i;j 2 fh;lg;i 6= j (19)
where ￿ = 1
jEl+Ehj. Then, an imitative behavior of the followers, xh
2, leads the
economy into a poverty trap if the initial number of H￿type "leaders", xH
1 , is
lower than a certain threshold value ~ xH
1 = C
e . Moreover, if xH
1 > ~ xH
1 , then
the relative population of xh
2 increases and Eh increases faster than El as xH
1
increases.
Besides, it is important the ￿nal position of the economic agents and/or
institutions on their types or pro￿les, that is, the fraction of leaders and followers
that are skilled. The initial number of high-pro￿le types of leaders determines
the evolution of high-pro￿le followers. For instance, if the initial number of
good institutions is high then the economic agents by imitative behavior would
decide the strategy of being high-pro￿le types. Hence, it would then be rational
for the leaders to be of high-pro￿le because they get larger bene￿ts with the
marriage with high-pro￿le followers. Then, the economy would go to the high
level equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
We studied an evolutionary game of the complementarity between the types of
pro￿les of the economic agents. We show that the economy can be located in
a low-level equilibrium and that there exist a threshold level equals the ratio
"education costs-e¢ ciency wages" to overcome the poverty trap. We found the
evolutionarily stable strategies of this game and we conclude that the possibility
of either high-level and low-level equilibria implies that players, economic agents,
acting under identical settings may experience either adequate living standard
or deprivation (growth or crisis), respectively, and it depends only on their
histories or initial conditions.
Hence, the types of economic agents or institutions can lead the economy
in a low-level or high-level equilibrium which are evolutionary outcomes. If
the leaders of the economy decide or have the incentives of being H￿type
strategists, then, by an imitative behavior of the followers the economy converges
to the high-level equilibrium (1,1).
15Countries where the number of economic agents surpasses the threshold lev-
els of physical and human capital can overcome the poverty trap, which is a
latent threat for any developing country. Notice that, it is not only necessary
the development of human capital to avoid the poverty trap, also it is necessary
the accumulation of physical capital or high technology complementing the de-
velopment of human capital. In fact, in many developing countries, a huge e⁄ort
in generating a quality educational system did not have an impact on the perfor-
mance of the economy. For example, several decades ago Uruguay and Argentina
have invested heavily in public education, in order to generate a highly-skilled
workforce. But this e⁄ort was not accompanied by a similar investment by the
￿rms in R&D. This happened because those countries were protectionist and
there were not competitiveness incentives to develop R&D departments. After
this failed attempt the outlays in education decreased, since high wages were
not correlated with time spent in schooling (Ros, 2001). This trend deepened
after the Uruguayan economy became more open. On the contrary, the ￿rms
using high technology in Mexico are foreign-owned (the so called maquiladoras)
that import their technology, which is developed abroad, and contract in Mex-
ico only low-skilled workers. Therefore, these ￿rms lack R&D departments in
Mexico and do not create incentives to increase the skills of their local workforce.
Future research indicates that the assumption on a constant number of
H￿type leaders should be modi￿ed, as for example, de￿ning the number of
H￿type leaders as an increasing function of the number of high-pro￿le follow-
ers, that is, xH
1 = f(xh
2); f0(￿) > 0.
We conclude that the market alone is incapable of overcoming this poverty
trap, policy makers should intervene, for instance, by providing some kind of
￿nancial incentive for R&D investment or by imposing a minimum period of
schooling.
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0 ￿((1 ￿ ￿)(V + u) + W ￿ w)
￿
It yields that, detJ = (W ￿ w + (1 ￿ ￿)(V + u))(C) > 0 and trJ < 0.
Hence this equilibrium point (0,0) is an attractor and then ESS.
2. xh
2 = xH
1 = 1. The evaluated Jacobean is given by,
J =
￿
￿(e ￿ C) 0
0 ￿(W ￿ w + (1 ￿ ￿)(U ￿ 2u ￿ v))
￿
Then, detJ > 0 and trJ < 0. Hence this equilibrium point (1,1) is an
attractor and ESS.
3. xh
2 = 1, xH




0 (1 ￿ ￿)(U ￿ 2u ￿ v) ￿ W + w
￿
Then, detJ > 0 and trJ > 0. In this case, the equilibrium point (1,0) is
repulsor.
4. xh
2 = 0, xH
1 = 1. The evaluated Jacobean in this case is,
J =
￿
e ￿ C 0
0 (1 ￿ ￿)(V + u) + W ￿ w
￿
Then, detJ > 0 and trJ > 0. In this case, the equilibrium point (0,1) is
repulsor.













2 (1 ￿ xh
￿
2 )(￿w + e)
xH
￿
1 (1 ￿ xH
￿








where | = xh
￿
2 ((1 ￿ ￿)(U ￿ 2u ￿ v) ￿ W + w). Then, detJ < 0 and then,
the equilibrium point (n￿
f;n￿
h) is a saddle point.
It characterizes the equilibria which are ESS.









are asymptotic steady states. In addition, for all of
the self-con￿rming equilibria to be possible long-run outcomes, it is necessary
that there not be too so much experimentation at any point in the process, as
otherwise players might learn the true distribution of o⁄-path play. By equations
(1) and (2), player 1 decides being H￿type if (1￿￿)U￿W￿e ￿ (1￿￿)v￿w and
￿ = 1, which is consistent with the fact that ￿ > C
e , hence it is a SCE. But if
(1￿￿)U ￿W ￿e < (1￿￿)v￿w and ￿ = 0 then 1 decides being L￿type which is
not consistent with ￿ > C
e and then it is not a SCE. Analogously, 2 prefers being
l￿type strategist if ￿ < C
e and 1 chooses H￿type only if (1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ W ￿ e ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)v ￿ w and ￿ = 1 which is not consistent, hence it is not a SCE. But 1
chooses L￿type only if (1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ W ￿ e < (1 ￿ ￿)v ￿ w and ￿ = 0, which is
consistent with ￿ < C
e , and then it is a SCE. In both Nash equilibria fH;hg and
fL;lg the economic agents earn the largest ￿tness payo⁄s and would continue to
do so with slight variations in the proportion of other mismatching types, or only
one type remains in the population and the other type cannot re-enter without
earning less than the other type. Since we have a game of incomplete information











correspond to (1,1) and
(0,0) steady states of the evolutionary game, respectively. The mixed strategy
corresponds to the interior equilibrium. Both equilibria (0,0) and (1,1) are
ESS and they cannot be invaded by any possible mutation or mutant strategy.








is a threshold in the form of a Skiba
point, since, by De￿nition 2 it separates the basins of attraction of the low-level
and high-level equilibria.
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such values, of course, depend on the population speci￿c matrices. Recall that
vectors (a1;a2) and (b1;b2) have opposite signs. Hence,
1. xH
1 = xh




￿￿1(a1 + b1) 0
0 ￿￿2(a2 + b2)
3
5:
when (b1;b2) are negative and (a1;a2) positive numbers,13 then,
det(J) = (￿￿1(a1 + b1)) ￿ (￿￿2(a2 + b2))> 0
tr(J) = ￿￿1(a1 + b1) ￿ ￿2(a2 + b2) < 0,












Note that, being (b1;b2) negative and (a1;a2) positive numbers, then,
det(J) > 0 and tr(J) < 0; and then, this equilibrium point (0,0) is
asymptotically stable and it is an ESS.
3. xH
1 = 1, xh





0 ￿2(a2 + b2)
3
5:
Being (b1;b2) negative and (a1;a2) positive numbers, then, det(J) > 0
and tr(J) > 0, and then, this equilibrium point (1,0) is a non-stable
node.
13Otherwise, if (b1;b2) are positive and (a1;a2) negative numbers, then, det(J) > 0 and
tr(J) < 0, and then, this equilibrium point (1,1) is asymptotically stable and then, it
is an ESS. Therefore, (1,1) is always a stable node.
194. xH
1 = 0, xh








Being (b1;b2) negative and (a1;a2) positive numbers, then, det(J) > 0
and tr(J) > 0, and then, this equilibrium point (0,1) is a non-stable
node.
5. The interior equilibrium ￿ xH
1 = ￿ b1
a1 and ￿ xh
2 = ￿ b2





￿1(1 + 2 b1
a1)(￿a1
b2
a2 + b1) ￿￿1b1(1 + b1
a1)
￿￿2b2(1 + b2







2<(b1;b2)< 0 and (a1;a2) are positive numbers, then, det(J) < 0 and
then, this equilibrium point
￿
￿ xH
1 ; ￿ xh
2
￿
is a saddle point.
20Proof of Proposition 4. If individuals do not observe exact payo⁄s of
neighbors, but they only observe average payo⁄s in the neighborhood and they
imitate the strategy that yields the highest average payo⁄. The process of
copying successful behaviors exhibits payo⁄ monotonic updating, since strategies
with above-average payo⁄s are adopted by others and thus increase their share
in the population, that is, Pij > Pji, 8i;j 2 fh;lg;i 6= j. In this way, system






2 = ￿_ xh
2: (ii)
(20)
We know that El (equation (2)) is always positive while Eh (equation (1))
can be either positive or negative depending on the training cost, C, of being a
h￿type "follower" which depends on the probability of being hired by a H￿type
strategist "leader", ￿ = xH
1 ￿ C
e . Then, Eh > 0 if C <
(1￿￿)wb
(1￿￿)(W￿w)+2e. Let us
assume a constant number of H￿type strategist of sub-population 1, and that


















El + Eh ;
_ xh
2 = Axh












Rl ￿ EhRh] + Rh





2(0) is the fraction of the high-pro￿le agents at time t = 0. It follows
that its solution depends on the number of high-pro￿le agents of sub-population
1, since Eh and El are increasing functions of the percentage of xH
1 . However if
xH
1 > ~ xH
1 then Eh increases faster than El as xH
1 increases15. Note that there
exists a threshold value for the high-pro￿le agents ~ xH
1 = C
e such that whether
xH
1 > ~ xH
1 the population of high-pro￿le agents increases16.
14This is the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamic which de￿nes an "innovative better
reply" dynamics. Indeed, strategies with payo⁄ below average decrease in frequency, while
strategies with payo⁄ above average increase, as long as they are rare enough (and even if
their frequency is 0).
15Note that if A > 0 then _ xh
2(t) > 0 for all t > ￿
Rl￿Eh
A .
16If the payo⁄ of high-pro￿le agents is negative, Eh < 0; then, equation (21(i)) takes the
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